
Surviving Cyrus SASL

A Tutorial by Patrick Koetter & Ralf Hildebrandt at the Linuxforum 2007 in Kopenhagen, Denmark


The Goal

Mailserver




Architecture


Components



Protocols



Areas of Authentication



Cyrus SASL

What is Cyrus SASL?

Cyrus SASL is

- an authentication-framework
- an implementation of SASL, the "Simple Authentication and Security Layer"
- standardised
- described in RFC 2222
- "the child of those sitting on the standard"

Application Range

- Cyrus SASL does not act on its own.
- Embedded into an connection-oriented application (e.g. SMTP, FTP, POP3, IMAP, LDAP)
 Cyrus SASL provides a protocol, which

"(...) includes a command for identifying and authenticating a user to a server and for optionally negotiating protection of subsequent protocol interactions. If its use is negotiated, a security layer is inserted between the protocol and the connection."

Advantages

Integrating Cyrus SASL in an application,

- simplifies software development
- provides stable and reliable functionality
- increases interoperability with other RFC compliant software

Disadvantages


Using Cyrus SASL in an application,

- drives users nuts, because the existing documentation focuses on developers
- may not get you far, because many things are undocumented
- is hard to memorize, because everything is handled differently

How Cyrus SASL works

- Cyrus SASL provides the libsasl library to developers
- Developers link the library into their application
- Mode, client- or server-mode, determines what libsasl will do for the application


libsasl in Client-Application



Tasks

- determine which mechanism the client must use during authentication
- process the tasks required by the mechanism

libsasl in Server-Application



Tasks

- identify a list of mechanisms the server may offer
- process the tasks required by a chosen mechanism
- hand over authentication data to a password verification service
- notify server of authentication result

SASL-Terms used in authentication

- Client and server use an authentication interface to communicate
- They use mechanisms to exchange authentication data
- A password verification service or a method verify data in an authentication backend
- The server sends the authentication result to the client
- The server may authorize the client to take some action

Authentication Interface

Authentication Interface is the place where client and server meet to exchange authentication data and information.

- The application protocol defines client-server communication
- SASL is a framework for many applications. It must be free from application-specific protocol requirements
- Application protocols must specify client- and server-commands to carry out authentication
- libsas1 is the glue for application-specific commands and universal SASL-routines

Mechanisms

Mechanisms define strategies for sending authentication data.

"SASL mechanism names must be registered with the IANA."

Groups of Mechanisms

Similar characteristics serve to group mechanisms:

- Plaintext-mechanisms
- Shared-Secret-mechanisms
- Ticket-mechanisms
- External-mechanisms

Group Characteristics

- ProcessingHow is authentication processed?
- Data
 Which data are send during authentication?
- Security
 Which level of security can be achieved from the various processing data combinations?

Plaintext-mechanisms

Procedure

Mechanism encodes authentication data base64 (some transports are not 8-bit clean).

Data

Plaintext-mechanisms send username, password and (maybe) realm.

Security

- Transport is unencrypted
 Transport layer may be encrypted using TLS.
- Authentication data must be stored on the server.

Available mechanisms

- PLAIN
- LOGIN

PLAIN

authcid, authzid and password will be base64-encoded and sent as one string

250-mail.example.com

250-PIPELINING

250-SIZE 10240000

250-AUTH DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5 GSSAPI PLAIN LOGIN

250-AUTH=DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5 GSSAPI PLAIN LOGIN

250-XVERP

250 8BITMIME

AUTH PLAIN dXNlcm5hbWUAdXNlcm5hbWUAcGFzc3dvcmQ=

235 Authentication successful

QUIT

221 Bye

LOGIN

Username, *password* and optionally the *domainname* will be base64-encoded separately and also sent separately.

LOGIN is a proprietary Microsoft mechanism. It is not standardised and documentation is not freely available.

Outlook und Outlook Express can't do PLAIN, but they can do LOGIN.

Beispiel (SMTP)

```
220 smtp.example.com ESMTP server ready
```

EHLO test.example.com

250-smtp.example.com

250-STARTTLS

250 AUTH LOGIN CRAM-MD5

AUTH LOGIN

334 VXNlciBOYW1lAA== # User Name

dGlt # Tim

334 UGFzc3dvcmQA # Password

dGFuc3RhYWZ0YW5zdGFhZg== # tanstaaftanstaaf

235 Authentication successful.

Shared-Secret-mechanisms

Procedure

Shared-Secret-mechanisms are Challenge-Response methods.

The server produces a challenge. The client can only solve (response) it, if it uses identical authentication data.

Data

- Username and challenge are encrypted using the password.
- The complete string will be sent base64-encoded.
- The password is never sent.

Security

- Data is transported encoded and encrypted
- Authentication data must be stored on the server
- The password must be stored in plaintext format

Available Mechanisms

- CRAM-MD5
- DIGEST-MD5
- NTLM

External-mechanisms

EXTERNAL relies on external mechanisms that are not part of SASL

"The server uses information, external to SASL, to determine whether the client is authorized to authenticate as the authorization identity. If the client is so authorized, the server indicates successful completion of the authentication exchange; otherwise the server indicates failure."

TLS

TLS is the only EXTERNAL-mechanism met "in the wild".

- TLS offers client- and server-authentication using certificates.
- TLS encrypts the transport layer.

Ticket-mechanisms

Procedure

- Client authenticates with Kerberos-server and receives a ticket granting ticket.
- The ticket granting ticket enables the client to request a ticket that grants usage of a service.

Data

- Client sends username and password to Kerberos-server.
- Client sends only ticket granting ticket to gain access to service.

Security

Neither username nor password are sent during SASL authentication.

Available Mechanisms

- Kerberos_4(vulnerable, don't use it)
- GSSAPI (Kerberos_5)"the" secure mechanism

Password Verification Service

Password Verification Services verify authentication data on behalf of libsasl.

Advantages

- run as standalone daemons on the server
- may be run with special privileges (while the server application uses least privileges)
- may access authentication backends requiring special privileges

Disadvantages

can only handle "insecure" plaintext-mechanisms

Available Password Verification Services

- pwcheck
- saslauthd

pwcheck

- pwcheck is the old, original Cyrus SASL Password Verification Service
- was used until end of Cyrus SASL 1.5.xx series
- is still part of the Cyrus SASL source tree
- pwcheck is deprecated

saslauthd

saslauthd is the official, current Cyrus SASL Password Verification Service.

It can access various authentication backends:

```
# saslauthd -v
saslauthd 2.1.19
authentication mechanisms: getpwent kerberos5 pam rimap shadow ldap
```

- getpwentAccess passwd
- kerberos5
 Authenticate against local Kerberos realm
- pam
 Send request to Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) and use result
- rimap
 Attempt login to remote IMAP-server.
- shadow
 Access shadow-file.
- ldap
 Authenticate (simple bind) with LDAP-server

Auxiliary Property Plugins

Auxiliary property plugins verify authentication data on behalf of libsasl (and they may do more...).

Advantages

- may access a variety of authentication backends
- may also write (create, modify) to authentication backends
- can do proxy authentication
- may use all available mechanism groups

Disadvantages

 cannot access authentication backends that require privileges beyond the server they are executed from

Available Auxiliary Property Plugins

- sasldb
- sql
- ldapdb

sasldb

sasIdb is the Cyrus SASL standard authentication backend

- sasldb is a Berkeley DB
- sasIdb database format was changed from Cyrus SASL version 1.x to 2.x. to make offering Shared-Secret mechanisms possible
- since Cyrus SASL 2.x passwords are stored in sasIdb as plaintext.

Utilities

- saslpasswd2
 - Create sasldb2
 - Create accounts in sasIdb2
 - Modify accounts in sasIdb2
- sasldblistusers2List sasldb2-users

sql

sql is a generic driver to access various SQL-servers

- MySQL
- PostgreSQL
- SQLite

Typical Problems

Accessing the SQL-server via PAM, in order to store passwords encrypted. The same people don't seem to mind sending username and password unencrypted over the wire...

The "frost"-patch "fixes" unencrypted storage in the SQL-server at the price of losing shared-secret mechanisms.

ldapdb

Idapdb is a driver to access the OpenLDAP server.

The driver implements proxy authentication as described in RFC 2222:

"The separation of the authorization identity from the identity in the client's credentials. This permits agents such as proxy servers to authenticate using their own credentials, yet request the access privileges of the identity for which they are proxying."

Idapdb requires configuring Cyrus SASL authentication two times:

- Login of Cyrus SASL ldapdb-Plugin to slapd
- Usage of Idapdb-Plugin within server application

Configuration

What needs to be configured?

Client

- only needs the credentials
- The client (not SASL) may want to avoid certain mechanisms

Server

Server applications must be configured before Cyrus SASL serves them. A server application sends two values to libsasl

- application_name
 application_name specifies part of the string used to identify the server-specific configuration file
- service_name
 service_name specifies the service (protocol) libsasl serves. PAM uses the service
 name to identify the service-specific configuration file.

Parameters

Cyrus SASL knows generic and method-specific parameters.

Parameters that are specific to a method must be specified

- on the command line when a password verification service is used
- in an application_name.conf when auxprop-plugins are used

Generic Parameters

log_level

log_level controls the level of verbosity of messages sent to the syslogd service.

Level	Verbosity
0	no messages
1	unusual errors
2	all authentication errors
3	log non-fatal warnings
4	more verbose than 3
5	more verbose than 4
6	traces of internal protocols
7	traces of internal protocols, including pass-
	words

Logging is inconsistent

No password verification service or auxprop-plugin implements all log levels. Some don't log at all...

pwcheck_method

Specifies one or more password verification services and/or auxprop-plugins to process authentication.

Valid values are the names of the password verification services or auxprop-plugins.

mech_list

Specifies a list of mechanisms a Cyrus SASL may offer a server.

Valid values are the names of mechanisms, separated by whitespace.

Method-spezific Parameters

... hold on. We'll take a look at them when practice...

Testing

Tools to test

Testing Cyrus SASL isolated is important! Without you'll have a hard time to tell if the error is in Cyrus SASL or the server that offers authentication.

Many admins spend days looking for the error in their application...

Problem

Cyrus SASL has no "tools" to test!

testsaslauthd

testsaslauthd only tests the password verification service saslauthd.

Problem

Successful testing does not prove all of the Cyrus SASL framework is okay, because testsaslauthd does not (!) use the Cyrus SASL mechanism libraries...

Command

```
# testsaslauthd
```

client — server

Cyrus SASL sources bring sample applications to demonstrate integration for developers.

Surprise!

sample applications are undocumented...

Server

```
# ./sample-server -h
lt-sample-server: Usage: lt-sample-server [-b min=N, max=N] [-e ssf=N, id=ID] [-m MECH] [-
f FLAGS] [-i local=IP, remote=IP] [-p PATH] [-d DOM] [-u DOM] [-s NAME]
       -b ... #bits to use for encryption
               min=N minumum #bits to use (1 => integrity)
               max=N maximum #bits to use
       -e ... assume external encryption
               ssf=N external mech provides N bits of encryption
               id=ID external mech provides authentication id ID
       -m MECH force use of MECH for security
       -f ... set security flags
               noplain
                              require security vs. passive attacks
               noactive
                              require security vs. active attacks
               nodict
                              require security vs. passive dictionary attacks
               forwardsec
                              require forward secrecy
               maximum
                              require all security flags
               passcred
                              attempt to receive client credentials
       -i ... set IP addresses (required by some mechs)
               local=IP; PORT
                              set local address to IP, port PORT
```

```
-s NAME service name to pass to mechanisms
        -d DOM local server domain
        -u DOM user domain
        -l enable server-send-last
# ./sample-client -h
lt-sample-client: Usage: lt-sample-client [-b min=N, max=N] [-e ssf=N,id=ID] [-m MECH] [-
f FLAGS] [-i local=IP, remote=IP] [-p PATH] [-s NAME] [-n FQDN] [-u ID] [-a ID]
        -b ... #bits to use for encryption
               min=N minumum #bits to use (1 => integrity)
               max=N maximum #bits to use
        -e ... assume external encryption
               ssf=N external mech provides N bits of encryption
               id=ID external mech provides authentication id ID
        -m MECH force use of MECH for security
        -f ... set security flags
                               require security vs. passive attacks
               noplain
               noactive
                               require security vs. active attacks
               nodict
                               require security vs. passive dictionary attacks
               forwardsec
                               require forward secrecy
                               require all security flags
               maximum
                               attempt to pass client credentials
               passcred
        -i ... set IP addresses (required by some mechs)
```

remote=IP; PORT set remote address to IP, port PORT

-p PATH colon-seperated search path for mechanisms

Client

```
local=IP; PORT set local address to IP, port PORT
remote=IP; PORT set remote address to IP, port PORT
-p PATH colon-seperated search path for mechanisms
-r REALM realm to use -s NAME service name pass to mechanisms
-n FQDN server fully-qualified domain name
-u ID user (authorization) id to request
-a ID id to authenticate as
-d Disable client-send-first
-l Enable server-send-last
```

Practice

shadow authentication

Procedure

- Prepare saslauthd environment
- Create user test
- Test
 - using testsaslauthd
 - using sample-server und sample-client
- Configure AUTH
 - in Postfix
 - in Cyrus IMAP

saslauthd

```
# /usr/sbin/saslauthd -h
usage: saslauthd [options]
option information:
  -a <authmech> Selects the authentication mechanism to use.
                 Enable credential caching.
  -C
                 Debugging (don't detach from tty, implies -V)
  -d
                 Combine the realm with the login before passing to
  - r
                 authentication mechanism Ex. login: "foo" realm: "bar"
                 will get passed as login: "foo@bar" The realm name is
                 passed untouched.
  -0 <option>
                 Optional argument to pass to the authentication
                 mechanism.
  _ ]
                 Disable accept() locking. Increases performance, but
                 may not be compatible with some operating systems.
                 Alternate path for the saslauthd working directory,
  -m <path>
                 must be absolute.
                 Number of worker processes to create.
  -n cprocs>
  -s <kilobytes> Size of the credential cache (in kilobytes)
  -t <seconds>
                 Timeout for items in the credential cache (in seconds)
                 Display version information and available mechs
  -v
                 Enable verbose logging
  -V
                 Display this message.
  -h
```

Preparing saslauthd environment

A classic...

The socket directory (run path) is missing...

```
# /usr/sbin/saslauthd -d -a shadow
saslauthd[20983] :main
                       : num procs : 5
saslauthd[20983] :main
                        : mech option: NULL
saslauthd[20983] :main
                        : run path : /var/run/saslauthd
                        : auth mech : shadow
saslauthd[20983]
                :main
                        : could not chdir to: /var/run/saslauthd
saslauthd[20983] :main
saslauthd[20983] :main
                        : chdir: No such file or directory
saslauthd[20983] :main
                        : Check to make sure the directory exists and is
                        : writeable by the user this process runs as.
saslauthd[20983] :main
```

Testing

Create user test

```
# useradd test
# passwd test
```

Test using testsaslauthd

```
# testsaslauthd -u test -p -test -s smtp
```

Testing using sample-server and sample-client

sample-server sends sample as application name.

/usr/lib/sasl2/sample.conf

```
pwcheck_method: saslauthd
mech list: PLAIN LOGIN
```

Start both applications in different terminals:

Terminal 1

```
# sample-server -p 8000 -s rcmd -m PLAIN
```

Terminal 2

```
# sample-client -p 8000 -s rcmd -m PLAIN localhost
```

Configuring AUTH

There are two ways application specific configuration options can be given to Cyrus SASL:

- store them in a separate configuration file located in /usr/lib/sas12. Since 2.1.22 --with-configuration for configure option made the location configurable.
- let server read configuration options from its own configuration file and pass them on when it calls libsasl.

Postfix

Postfix uses a separate configuration file. It sends the (configurable) application_name smtpd to libsasl by default.

/usr/lib/sasl2/smtpd.conf

pwcheck_method: saslauthd

mech list: PLAIN LOGIN

Cyrus IMAP

Cyrus IMAP passes options to libsasl from its own configuration file.

/etc/imapd.conf

```
sasl_pwcheck_method: saslauthd
sasl mech list: PLAIN LOGIN
```

sasldb authentication

Procedure

- Create sas1db2
- Test using sample-server and sample-client
- Configure AUTH
 - in Postfix
 - in Cyrus IMAP

saslpasswd2

 $-\nabla$

saslpasswd2 -h This product includes software developed by Computing Services at Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.cmu.edu/computing/). saslpasswd2: usage: saslpasswd2 [-v] [-c [-p] [-n]] [-d] [-a appname] [f sasldb] [-u DOM] userid pipe mode -- no prompt, password read on stdin **-**p create -- ask mechs to create the account - C disable -- ask mechs to disable/delete the account -d no userPassword -- don't set plaintext userPassword -n property (only set mechanism-specific secrets) -f sasldb use given file as sasldb -a appname use appname as application name

-u DOM use DOM for user domain

print version numbers and exit

Creating sasldb

Testing

sample-server sends sample as application_name.

/usr/lib/sasl2/sample.conf

```
pwcheck_method: auxprop
auxprop plugin: sasldb
```

mech_list: PLAIN LOGIN CRAM-MD5 DIGEST-MD5

Call both applications from separate terminals:

Terminal 1

```
# sample-server -p 8000 -s rcmd -m PLAIN
```

Terminal 2

```
# sample-client -p 8000 -s rcmd -m PLAIN localhost
```

Question

Do more secure mechanisms work?

Configuring AUTH

Postfix

/usr/lib/sasl2/smtpd.conf

```
pwcheck_method: auxprop
auxprop_plugin: sasldb
```

mech_list: PLAIN LOGIN CRAM-MD5 DIGEST-MD5

Cyrus IMAP

/etc/imapd.conf

```
sasl_pwcheck_method: auxprop
sasl_auxprop_plugin: sasldb
sasl mech list: PLAIN LOGIN CRAM-MD5 DIGEST-MD5
```

ldapdb-Plugin

What makes Idapdb-plugin special?

Idapdb is the most complex plugin currently available from the Cyrus SASL source tree:

- Idapdb uses proxy authentication
 The plugin must authenticate before it may authenticate the given data
- OpenLDAP expects SASL authentication
 The plugin must be configured to do SASL authentication
- SASL authentication must be configured for OpenLDAP slapd server
 OpenLDAP slapd must have been built to SASL authentication
- slapd must only offer mechanisms the ldapdb-SASL-client can handle
- OpenLDAP does not permit a proxy-user to do proxy-authentication by default
 A global or a per-user policy must be configured
- OpenLDAP does not permit a proxy-user to search any path for proxy-authentication
 A search path must be configured.

Steps

OpenLDAP

Directory Information Tree (DIT)

slapd


- basic configuration
- SASL authentication
 - configure
 - test
- Proxy-user
 - define search permissions
 - define search path

ldapdb-Plugin

- Understand parameters
- configure sample-server
- Test using sample-client and sample-server

Directory Information Tree

Structure



slapd

Basic configuration

Schema

Database

Importing Directory Information Tree

Importing DIT offline

```
"Your slapd(8) should not be running when you do this to ensure consistency of the database."
```

```
# /etc/init.d/ldap stop
# slapadd -v -c -b "dc=example,dc=com" -l example.com.ldif
```

Tip

Fix user and group permissions...

Configuring Authentication Mapping

Users, using SASL authentication to login to OpenLDAP, are treated internally within a special context:

The internal view is follows either this "authentication request DN" pattern:

```
uid=<username>, cn=<realm>, cn=<mechanism>, cn=auth
```

or this one:

```
uid=<username>, cn=<mechanism>, cn=auth
```

Neither of the both patterns match the DN of the proxy-user!

An authentication mapping matches the authentication request DN against the proxy-user DN pattern:

```
authz-regexp
  uid=(.*),cn=.*,cn=auth
  ldap://dc=example,dc=com??sub?(&(objectclass=inetOrgPerson)(mail=$1))
```

Important

- More than one mapping may be configured
- First match wins!

Testing Authentication Mapping

- Use 1dapwhoami as proxy-user to login to OpenLDAP.
- Switch into role of user requesting authentication
- Show identity

Proxy-User

Proxy-Authentication Policy

An *authenticated* proxy-user is not *not authorized* by default to use other users' credentials.

- policy in slapd.conf configures authorization
- policy is set using authz-policy parameter

authz-policy parameter

Valid values (since OpenLDAP 2.3.x) are:

to

DN specifies destinations where proxy-user may use credentials

from

DN specifies a user permitted to act as proxy-user

any

Either policy may be used

all

Both policies must be given

Authorizing the Proxy-User

authz-policy parameter settings control which attribute must be added to user objects.

Using "to" as authz-policy

- Add authzTo attribute to proxy-user object
- authzTo attribute configures a LDAP search down the branch(es) where Proxy-User is authorized to authenticate.

Example

```
authzTo: ldap:///ou=people,dc=example,dc=com??sub? \
    (&(objectclass=inetOrgPerson)(mail=*))
```

Using "from" as authz-policy

- A user adds authzFrom attribute to its object, if it wants to authorize the proxy-user.
- The attribute defines the DN of the proxy-user that should be allowed to authenticate.

Example

```
authzFrom: dn.exact:uid=proxyuser,ou=auth,dc=example,dc=com
```

Configuring Idapdb

ldapdb parameters

```
auxprop plugin: ldapdb
  The name of the LDAPDB-auxprop-plugin is ldapdb.
ldapdb uri
  Specifies one ore more URIs (List), the plugin should use as authentication backend. Ser-
  ver may offer unencrypted (ldap://) or encrypted (ldaps://) connections.
ldapdb id
  Proxy-user username
ldapdb pw
  Proxy-user password in plaintext
ldapdb mech
  Specifies the mechanism the plugin should use when it logs into the LDAP server.
ldapdb rc
  Specifies a path to a configuration file where options for the ldapdb-LDAP-client would be
  stored. Such options could be paths to TLS certificates...
ldapdb starttls
  Specifies TLS requirement level ("try" or "demand").
```

Testing ldapdb

Sample Configuration

/usr/lib/sasl2/sample.conf

```
log_level: 7
pwcheck_method: auxprop
auxprop_plugin: ldapdb
mech_list: PLAIN LOGIN DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5
ldapdb_uri: ldap://localhost
ldapdb_id: proxyuser
ldapdb_pw: proxy_secret
ldapdb_mech: DIGEST-MD5
```

Both applications are run from different terminals:

Terminal 1

```
# sample-server -p 8000 -s rcmd -m PLAIN
Terminal 2
# sample-client -p 8000 -s rcmd -m PLAIN localhost
```

Postfix

Configuration

/usr/lib/sasl2/smtpd.conf

```
log_level: 7
pwcheck_method: auxprop
auxprop_plugin: ldapdb
mech_list: PLAIN LOGIN DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5
ldapdb_uri: ldap://localhost
ldapdb_id: proxyuser
ldapdb_pw: proxy_secret
ldapdb_mech: DIGEST-MD5
```

Cyrus IMAP

Configuration

/etc/imapd.conf

```
sasl_log_level: 7
sasl_pwcheck_method: auxprop
sasl_auxprop_plugin: ldapdb
sasl_mech_list: PLAIN LOGIN DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5
sasl_ldapdb_uri: ldap://localhost
sasl_ldapdb_id: proxyuser
sasl_ldapdb_pw: proxy_secret
sasl_ldapdb_mech: DIGEST-MD5
```

Security Considerations

Potential attacks

Network communication

Two areas where network communication may be eavesdropped:

- From client-application to server-application
 Use TLS to protect plaintext-mechanisms!
- From server-application to LDAP server
 Use secure mechanisms only

Credentials

Two areas where credentials can be eavesdropped:

- Client-application
 Protection depends on OS and client
- Server-application (ldapdb-plugin)
 Use TLS client certificate for ldapdb-plugin instead of a password!

Certification Authority

Locations vary from distribution to distribution...

Create CA

Use CA(.pl)-script to create CA

```
# ./CA -newca
```

We need certificates for OpenLDAP server and Idapdb-plugin.

Important for proxy-user certificate

DN in proxy-user certificate must match exactly its DN in the directory!

Create request and key in one run

```
# openssl req -new -nodes -keyout slapd_key.pem -out slapd_key.pem \
-days 365
```

Sign certificate

```
# openssl ca -policy policy_anything -out slapd_cert.pem \
-infiles slapd key.pem
```

Configuring slapd-Server

CA certificate, private key and public server certificate must be specified in slapd.conf.

```
TLSCACertificateFile /etc/pki/CA/cacert.pem
TLSCertificateFile /etc/openldap/cacerts/slapd_cert.pem
TLSCertificateKeyFile /etc/openldap/cacerts/slapd_key.pem
```

Demand TLS while you test!

TLSVerifyClient demand

Configuring Idapdb-Client

/usr/lib/sasl2/smtpd.conf

```
log_level: 7
pwcheck_method: auxprop
auxprop_plugin: ldapdb
mech_list: PLAIN LOGIN DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5
ldapdb_uri: ldap://localhost
ldapdb_id: proxyuser
ldapdb_mech: EXTERNAL
ldapdb_starttls: demand
ldapdb_rc: /usr/lib/sasl2/ldaprc
```

/usr/lib/sasl2/ldaprc

```
TLS_CERT /usr/lib/sasl2/ma_cert.pem
TLS_KEY /usr/lib/sasl2/ma_key.pem
TLS_CACERT /etc/pki/CA/cacert.pem
TLS_REQCERT demand
```

Questions?

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